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The end of an era. That is the way in which many people, Ghanaians and
non-Ghanaians alike, described the outcome of the presidential and legislative
élections held in Ghana in December 2000. In two rounds (December 7 and 28)
the ruling National Democratie Congress (NDC) was routed. It lost roughly half
the total number of seats in parliament, plus its majority, and, in the second round,
the presidency itself. In the first round of presidential polls the NDC candidate,
John Atta Mills, got only 44 per cent of the votes against 48 per cent for the main
opposition candidate, John Agyekum Kufuor (popularly known as Jak), the leader
of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) (www.ec.gov.gh).1 After the first round, the
NDC was visibly shaken. On Ghana télévision, the Minister of Education humbly
admitted that thé NDC would hâve to change its message. Unfortunately for thé
NDC, it was too late for this. The second round of presidential poils culminated in
a resounding NPP victory, with Kufuor gaining nearly 57 per cent of the votes
and Mills trailing with 43 per cent (see Table l).2 The NDC, which had been in
power for eight years,3 had been decisively beaten.
This article seeks to explain what caused this remarkable event. Firstly, it will
present and analyse the main trends in the results of the parliamentary and
presidential polls. Then it discusses some of the principal features of the électoral
process itself. Thirdly, the article analyses the causes of the NDC's defeat. It is
argued that its démise was triggered by a combination of factors, among which
the poor state of the economy and the departure, formally at least, of Jerry
Rawlings as government leader, assume considérable importance. Other factors
were the high-handedness with which the party nominated its presidential candi-
date and those running for parliament; the glaring corruption that increasingly
tainted the NDC's record and became a source of considérable resentment; and,
more generally, fatigue over the same ruling class that had continued to dominate
Ghana's political scène for nearly a decade and grown increasingly arrogant and
complacent. Against this, the opposition NPP waged a very effective and formi-
dable campaign. Finally, the article discusses the significance of the NDC's
defeat in the context of the long-term development of multiparty politics in Ghana
and African démocratisation generally.4
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The Results
Ghana's électoral System provides for various ways in which the country's parlia-
ment and président are elected. The Ghanaian parliament is made up of 200
members elected by simple majority or plurality vote in single member constitu-
encies for four-year terms (thé so-called 'first-past-the-post' System). The prési-
dent is elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term. The candidate who
gains a simple majority stands elected. In case no candidate receives more than 50
per cent of the valid votes cast, a second round, or run-off, must take place
between thé two candidates who scored thé highest number of votes in thé first
round. Presidential tenure of office is limited to a maximum of two four-year
terms.
In thé parliamentary poils on December 7, the NPP proved for thé first time that it
could eut deeply into territory that throughout thé 1990s had been part of the
NDC's fief. In particular, many constituencies in Brong-Ahafo, Western Région
and thé Greater Accra Région, formerly NDC strongholds, feil to the opposition.
Ail in ail, thé NPP won in five of thé 10 régions and half the total seats in
parliament (100 to thé NDC 92). In Central Région, Atta Mills' home prov-
ince, thé NDC just barely beat thé NPP (nine to eight seats). Only thé four
poorest ones — Upper East, Upper East, Northern Région and Volta — voted
overwhelmingly for thé NDC (www.ghanaelections.com). Moreover, during thé
first round the turn-out in Volta — President Rawlings' home base — was very
low, with only half a million voters, out of an estimated electorate of 980 000,
bothering to show up at thé polling booth: a turn-out of some 58 per cent (The
Ghanaian Times, December 12, 2000), much lower than in 1996 when it was 81
per cent. In the past Ghanaians jokingly referred to Volta as thé NDC's 'World
Bank'. The overall turn-out rate in thé first round was 61 per cent (Daily Graphie
[Accra], December 12, 2000). Quite apart from the turn-out in Volta, this gener-
ally low score was probably in part linked to flaws in thé voters' register, which
the Electoral Commission admitted to be inflated, possibly amounting to some
1.5 million uneligible or non-existing people.5
Not only did dozens of NDC parliamentarians lose their seat, but several among
them were also ministers who were defeated at the hands of NPP or independent
rivais. In this way, for example, the Minister of thé Interior, Nii Okaija Adamafio,
and thé one for Food and Agriculture, Joseph Henry Owusu Acheampong, lost
their parliamentary seat (The Evening News [Accra], December 8, 2000; Daily
Graphie, December 9, 2000).6 Generally during past élections, NDC members of
parliament had never been challenged in their districts as they were now, and they
showed themselves to be incohérent in their defence.7 The two rounds of polls
transformed the NPP, superficially at least, into a truly national party, although in
terms of thé régions it now controlled thé NPP was only slightly more dominant
than thé NDC. Rawlings' party was still the leading force in four out of 10
régions in the country: the three northern régions and Volta.
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Moreover, one should distinguish between thé parliamentary and presidential
élections and thé populär attitudes that determined their outcome. For example,
the reasons that people had for votmg for a parliamentary candidate may hâve
been affected by specifically local considérations that differed from what deter-
mined their presidential vote. The second round m thé presidential contest may
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also have been Influencée! by the so-called 'bandwagon' effect, that is, people
becoming increasingly inclinée to vote for the most likely winner in order not to
be marginalised afterwards for having betted on the wrong horse.8 The NPP's
candidate benefited in this round from support by the smaller parties, which
decided to rally behind Kufuor and advised their voters to give him their support.
Yet this bandwagon effect should not be overestimated, as the populär vote for
Mills held up rather well in the second round. The NDC candidate still gained a
majority in the three northern régions and Volta and, with the exception of
Ashanti, nowhere feil below a third of the vote.
Nevertheless, in the second round, Kufuor not only Consolidated his wins in
Brong-Ahafo, Western Region and Greater Accra, but also won Central Region
outright (Table 1). Hère he had already come out on top in 11 out of 17 constitu-
encies in the first round and now took 60 per cent against Atta Mills 39 per cent
(or 16 out of 17 constituencies) (www.ghanaelections.com). This graphically
underlines the extent of Mills' humiliation. Moreover, while in the second round
the north again showed to be solid NDC territory, even here some constituencies
went to Kufuor. Sissala in Upper West, Navrongo Central and Bolgatanga in
Upper East, and Yendi, Gukpegu/Sabongida and Choggo/Tishigu in Northern
Region returned Kufuor with more than 60 per cent of the votes. Some of these
constituencies had voted for Edward Mahama's small People's National Conven-
tion in the first round but others, including Choggo/Tishigu,9 had first shown a
(marginal) préférence for Atta Mills and now opted clearly for Kufuor. In total,
Kufuor took 48 per cent of the votes in Northern Region, 42 per cent in Upper
East, and 38 per cent in Upper West. He even managed to get one-fifth of the
votes in some individual Volta constituencies, although in the région as a whole
Kufuor trailed with an overall 11 per cent.10
M\IAm
The Electoral Process
On the whole, there was gréât satisfaction among Ghanaians about the conduct of
the polls. One observer argued them to have been the "fairest we ever had".11
Personal impressions of the first round yielded a picture of a very relaxed and
peaceful atmosphère, punctuated by meticulous and careful handling of registra-
tion procedure and électoral ritual. Observers of the various parties were present
at the polls, besides représentatives of non-governmental groups mandated to
observe the élections. Results came in relatively quickly, or more quickly than
bef ore, in part because of improved communications.12 According to political
observers and judging from newspaper articles, the Electoral Commission really
asserted its constitutional independence vis-à-vis the government, which could
not, or dared not, engage in massive acts of fraud, the more as the NPP this time
around kept a close watch on each and every detail of the électoral process.
In général, Ghana benefited from what might be termed the 'Côte d'Ivoire
factor' — and perhaps even from something that might be called the 'Florida
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factor'. The government had already aired ugly pictures on télévision from vio-
lent events in other West African countries such as neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire.
Many people, of varions persuasions argued that, whatever the électoral outcome,
Ghanaians did not want civil war. Peace groups and traditional leaders had issued
déclarations appealing for calm. Negotiations also took place beforehand about
the way in which the media should conduct themselves, centring on the need to
make clear whether results announced had been certified by the Electoral Com-
mission or not.13 This should prevent a répétition of hasty and unwarranted claims
to victory as had marred past Ghanaian élections or the US presidential contest in
Florida, the fall-out of which was still reverberating across the globe.14
There were, nevertheless, various irregularities, none of which appeared very
significant or structural. Firstly, there was a controversy over registration of
voters. The NPP had argued that people carrying ID cards without a photograph
should not be allowed to vote. A few days bef ore the first round, ho we ver, the
NDC won a case before thé Suprême Court, which vindicated its argument that
voters with so-called thumbprint IDs should also be allowed to vote — ostensibly
because otherwise poor voters would be disenfranchised. Many of thèse, includ-
ing in thé urban areas, were without photo ID. The NPP feared, however, that this
would open the gâte to fraud, through which thé NDC might be tempted to inflate
its share of the vote (Daily Graphie, December l, 5, 2000; The Evening News,
December 4, 2000; The Chronicle, December 3-14, 2000; The Ghanaian Times,
December 5, 2000 [all Accra]). It was supported in this by Western donor coun-
tries, some of which had funded thé production of photo IDs and became sub-
sequently embroiled in a row with thé Rawlings government over alleged
interférence in Ghana's internai affairs (Africa Confidential, November 24, 2000;
also editorial, Daily Graphie, December 1, 2000). In retrospect, this issue seems
to have evaporated and may only have helped to reinforce popularly held percep-
tions about thé lack of neutrality and independence of the courts.15 Other inci-
dents involved, among others, Kufuor's rather hasty claim to victory upon
completion of the first round, a claim that many NDC people argued was a
violation of Ghana's constitution (Daily Graphie, December 11, 2000; Ghana
Palaver, December 11-12, 2000; The Ghanaian Times, December 11, 2000).
There were also individual cases reported of potential voters turned away from
polling stations because of an irregularity in their ID or because their ID did not
tally with thé voters' register. At some polling stations, voting material arrived
late. Otherwise, thèse events seemed as incidental as some of the reports on vote
buying and pressure before thé élections appeared anecdotal. Clearly, thé Elec-
toral Commission kept its head cool — even in the face of protests by urban,
middle-class women in Accra, who were told that they would have to remove
false finger nails in order to have their finger marked after the act of voting (news
broadcast Ghana Télévision, December 3, 2000).
Despite the composure that marked most Ghanaians on and before polling day, it
was ironically President Rawlings himself who, in characteristic fashion, made
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some inflammatory remarks. Some of these may have been misquoted by certain
of the less impartial newspaper publications, but they appeared to be more typical
of Rawlings' own flamboyant personality than of Ghanaian political culture. For
example, at a rally in Kumasi hè was quoted to have said that the NPP would not
be allowed to succeed the NDC before the second coming of Christ. He was also
quoted, perhaps more accurately, to have misgivings about the very principle of
multiparty democracy. Yet Rawlings' address to the nation on the eve of polling
day was considered to be composed, sober and responsible (The Independent,
December 5, 2000; The Guide, December 7-13, 2000; F ree Press, December
8-14, 2000 [all Accra]).16
Nevertheless, during and after polling tempers sometimes ran high, as shown in
some violent incidents.17 In Accra, for example, NDC militants beat up a couple
of journalists after thé first round, an incident for which Atta Mills later offered
his apologies. The most serious incident took place on December 7 itself, in
Bawku Central constituency in Upper East Région. This incident was atypical,
however, for it was closely bound up with thé peculiar political problems that
have held this district in its grips for some time, involving a long-standing
politicised feud between thé Mamprasi and Kusasi ethnie groups, with each lining
up behind rival political parties. Delays in thé déclaration of results and some
sloppy handling of électoral procedure led to an outburst of anxiety, and security
personnel firing shots. The incident and subséquent rioting left several people
dead.18 Some calm was restored in thé day s folio wing thé incident and thé vice-
président visited the area in order to help in this effort. Bawku Central witnessed
the most serious violence during thé entire élection, something that was not
replicated in other constituencies.
The Reasons for Defeat
By the time of the élections, the economy was in deep crisis. Unemployment had
risen sharply, while cocoa and gold priées — the country's main sources of
income — had plummeted at a time that oil priées went through the roof. This
induced a free fall of the country's currency, thé Cedi. Priées of certain food
staples such as rice had doubled within a year and rising inflation had generally
begun to bite into salaries. A one-billion-dollar trade déficit was forecast and
while inflation stood at roughly 25 per cent, public foreign debt had risen to seven
billion dollars (Africa Confidential, November 24, 2000). Despite years of struc-
tural adjustment, private foreign Investment had, on the whole, been disappoint-
ing and largely limited to thé sell-off of Ghanaian companies to Asian
entrepreneurs. The so-called 'cash-and carry' System introduced to make people
contribute towards thé costs of Ghana's health care services was also very un-
populär.
Consequently, by 2000 the politics of gratitude that benefited thé NDC during thé
1996, and especially thé 1992, élections had finally run its course. The provision
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of roads, electricity and potable water that, according to some observers, had
carried away many Ghanaians in the past,19 was no longer a relevant factor, with
some of the thinly populated northern areas as a possible exception. Moreover,
the government did not dare to go on a spending spree, at least not to the extent
/}/-i
that it had in 1992, for fear of antagonising foreign donors. Most Ghanaians
were by now made to feel the pinch. Opinion polls conducted in 1999, showed
that Ghanaians were very dissatisfied with the state of the economy and blamed
the government for this (CDD 1999). By élection time, the political atmosphère in
Accra was marked by outright hostility towards the NDC.
While economie prospects in 1996 had also been bleak (Jeffries 1998:194) and
one could therefore argue that the current economie crisis, in itself, could possibly
not have sealed the NDC's fate, by 2000 key economie indicators had deterio-
rated substantially — also as compared to 1996. Cocoa priées had dropped by
nearly half in the preceding two years, while oil had more than doubled. By the
time of the élections, the Cedi had depreciated from 1,600 to 1,800 for one US
dollar in 1996 to 7.000 at regulär foreign exchange offices (Africa Research
Bulletin, 2000:14325; Africa South of the Sahara, 1998:504). The décision to
keep on subsidising domestic petrol priées also eut severely into the govern-
ment's revenue base, thus eroding its incumbency advantage to channel state
resources so as to influence the electorale. In the midst of this financial squeeze
many development projects that the government had promised had failed to
matérialise (Nugent 2001:413).
Nevertheless, there was one other crucial negative factor influencing the NDC's
chances at the polls — the absence of Rawlings as a contender, at least in a formal
sensé. Rawlings was constitutionally barred from standing for a third term. This
meant not only that the NDC lost the man that had provided firm leadership to the
party and its predecessor — the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC) — for two decades, but also that the only politician in Ghana enjoy-
ing real charisma was leaving the arena. In the two preceding élections, Rawlings
had shown his ability to persuade a majority of the electorale that hè was the only
worthy candidate to lead the country (see also Verlet 1997; Assimeng 1979). In
the 2000 vote, the Iwo main presidential contenders were a modest law professor
and a practising lawyer, who both had to do without comparable magnetism.
What was worse for Atta Mills was that Rawlings actively campaigned on his
behalf, making the élections at times look like a conlest between Rawlings and
Kufuor rather Ihan between Kufuor and Mills. Many observers thought that this
did not do Mills any good.21
Compared to the 1996 presidential vote,22 the NDC's share in the 2000 run-off
dropped significantly across the board. In all régions, with the exception of Volta
and Upper East, the NDC's share in the run-off was 10 percent down on its 1996
vote, or more. lts losses were highest in Brong-Ahafo (20 per cent); followed by
Eastern Region (16 per cent); Central Region (15 per cent); Greater Accra and
Western Region (14 per cent); and Upper West (13 per cent). lts share of the vote
AM
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in the Northern Region went down from 62 to 51 per cent and in Upper East from
69 to 57 per cent. Even in Volta — the région that provided Rawlings with the
highest percentage in 1996, Mills had to concède 6 per cent. However, it is not
easy to interpret these figures. Firstly, the NDC's figures in the 2000 run-off may
have been depressed by a bandwagon effect that worked to the advantage of
Kufuor. Secondly, some of the party's northern losses may have been tied to the
way in which the government had handled some of the ethnie conflicts in these
régions.23













































Perhaps thé best way to distinguish between Rawlings' departure and other fac-
tors — such as the state of the economy — as reasons for Mills' defeat, is to
compare the results of the 2000 presidential run-off with those of the parliamen-
tary élections that year (Table 2). The three régions where the parliamentary
results and those of the presidential run-off did not tally — and which could,
hence, potentially provide an indication of the significance of Rawlings' depar-
ture — are Northern, Western and Central Region. In the Northern Region, Mills
just narrowly defeated Kufuor in the run-off (51 to 48 per cent), whereas the NDC
won a substantial majority of seats in the parliamentary polls (18 to the NPP 3 and
others 2). Conversely, whereas Mills was roundly beaten in the Western Region's
run-off (60 to 39 per cent), his party won slightly more than half its parliamentary
seats (10 to the NPP 8 and the Convention People's Party, CPP, 1). In Central
Region the NDC took more seats than any other party, although Mills himself was
decisively beaten by Kufuor in the presidential run-off (39 to 60 per cent). That
this happened in Mills' own home ground provides, perhaps, the best indication
of the NDC's dependence on the personal popularity of the departing president.
However, its significance should maybe not be overestimated,24 as in seven of the
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10 régions the figures for thé parliamentary results and thé presidential run-off
followed each other more or less closely, with thé parties winning the majority of
çonstituencies where their presidential contender won as well. One may therefore
conclude that, overall, the Rawlings factor may have compounded the fall-out of
the economie crisis.
Another factor in the NDC's defeat was a serious controversy over the NDC's
lack of internai democracy that occurred well bef ore the élections. This was an
issue grossly mishandled by the party executive, as it refused to hold primaries for
the parliamentary and presidential élections — in the process confirming or
imposing unpopulär candidates in the çonstituencies and producing Atta Mills as
the presidential contender. Thus, before the élections it was rumoured that the
NDC might lose as many as 22 formerly safe seats over the parliamentary candi-
dates issue alone (Africa Confidential, November 24, 2000). There is a parallel
here with the situation in 1996, when numerous sitting MPs were deselected to
make way for wealthy members of the NDC (Nugent 1999:304). In addition to
this, however, the NDC had to come up with a successor to Rawlings, a process
that degenerated into an undignified row. When Rawlings openly backed Mills,
the NDC splintered, with some of its more intellectual forces leaving the party.
Many of these had provided the links between the rural areas and the centre in the
past and had argued for a restracturing of the party, but were systematically
obstructed in their effort. Consequently, well before the élections, many NDC
people had resigned or been expelled and joined the ne w National Reform Party,
which was predicted to do well in the impending contest.25
Rampant corruption was another important issue. For years, the NDC had been
collecting dues from people and companies that were awarded government con-
tracts.26 This form of corruption engendered deep hostility among Ghanaians, or
more accurately, among those who did not benefit. For well over a decade,
Ghanaians could see how "nobodies turned into somebodies"27 and how NDC
stalwarts developed ostentatious lifestyles that were well out of reach for most
ordinary people. The Serious Fraud Office investigated several, well-publicised
cases and found varions forms of irregularities, but neither the president's office
^Qnor the NDC-dominated parliament took any action. While régulations on party
funding require the submission of audited accounts to the Electoral Commission,
these accounts have usually been very vague. The NDC, in particular, failed to
follow certain légal provisions, arguing them to be unworkable, despite the fact
that it had voted them into law itself.29 The fact that, in the 2000 contest, the NDC
no longer offered a charismatic contender may have made voters — especially in
the more wealthy central régions — less forgiving of the party's vices.
There were only marginal ideological différences between the two official presi-
dential candidates. The NPP man laid more emphasis on human rights and the
rule of law — a veiled référence to the human rights' violations that have tainted
the record of the (P)NDC. But as in 1996, economie différences were quite small:
both candidates professed a willingness to continue structural adjustment, al-
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though the NPP preferred to slow down Implementation of certain aspects of it.30
The NDC's élection slogan was more explicitly economie than that of the NPP:
"always for people, always for development", with billboards showing Atta Mills
against a surrealist background of large, modern motorways and high-rise build-
ings but ironically without any people. Contrary to the situation in 1992 and even
1996, the government could not back up its boasts with an abundance of impres-
sive development projects, or séduce the electorale with the charisma of its
departing leader. Hence, in the end it seems that the reasons for the NDC's
démise were made painfully clear in the simplicity of the NPP' s slogan, "positive
change". People were tired of the same old party stalwarts, the same patronage
networks, and the same old solutions offered to Ghana's economie and social
predicaments, the more so as the government that had implemented them did not
prevent the economy's catastrophic plunge. Some of this fatigue was especially
generational, as younger people had never known any alternative to (P)NDC rule.
Some of its représentatives made themselves unpopulär through unfortunate re-
marks and most ministers appeared to have run out of fresh ideas. What made
matters worse was what many saw as government arrogance, complacency and
outright vindictiveness towards those Ghanaians who never supported the NDC
and became the victim of its politics of exclusion.31
In addition, the NPP was much better organised than in 1996 or 1992. It com-
menced mobilising and canvassing very early. Kufuor was chosen as presidential
candidate in October 1998 (Africa Research Bulletin, 1998:13323) and went on
the campaign trail almost immediately. As the results of the élections point out,
the NPP proved able to eut into territory where it did not have much support in the
past, at least not during the two preceding élections. The significance of some of
these gains should, however, be qualified, as in some cases, such as Brong-Ahafo,
the party essentially recaptured territory which in the 1969 and 1979 élections had
been among the core areas of the Progress Party (PP) and Populär Front Party
(PFP) respectively — that is, the parties of the old Danquah-Busia tradition
preceding the NPP (Nugent 1999:312).
Nevertheless, in the 2000 vote the NPP also gained support, at least to a limited
extent, from sections of the population other than those represented by the Dan-
quah-Busia tradition. Thus it widened its support base from its original Ashanti
and urban middle class bias by mobilising interests from other régions and social
strata. The young were especially targeted. Kufuor took a northerner as running
mate and the party also focused more on the north during the campaign. Signifi-
cantly, the NPP was also able to penetrate deeper into the rural areas. The fact that
the NPP commanded fewer billboards and flags and other élection paraphernalia,
as some observers pointed out, did not say everything. What seems important was
NPP willingness to go to those people who never formed its natural électorale. lts
gains stand out as the more remarkable as, contrary to 1996 (Jeffries 1998:191-
192), the party did not form a pre-electoral pact with fellow opposition parties
such as some of the Nkrumahist splinter groups.
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In the 2000 campaign, the government also did not get in the way, at least not
openly or to any great extent. The playing field was therefore more even, espe-
cially as compared to the traumatic élection of 1992. Although the NDC had by
far the most resources, indigenous businesses, notably from Ashanti, contributed
to NPP coffers.32 The NPP also benefited from the numerous FM radio stations
ready to spread the party's message. lts électoral achievement stands out in even
sharper relief when set against the logistical superiority of the NDC. The ruling
party commanded far more means of transport, not only cars, buses and four-
wheel drive vehicles, but even bicycles with which it could visit just about every
single Ghanaian hamlet. Against this, the NPP responded with an intimidating
travelling schedule, taking on non-Akan people in the party leadership in order to
distance itself from widespread perceptions that it was fundamentally an Akan
party.33 Whether this really worked cannot be deduced simply from the électoral
outcome. It is, in any case, noteworthy that the stiff middle-class Kufuor did his
best to appeal to ordinary Ghanaians, including the rural folk. On several occa-
sions hè spoke in the vernacular or mixed his English with Twi, while steering
clear of sweating in three-piece woollen suits at 30 degrees centigrade in favour
of more traditional African couture. In contrast, four years before, the NPP's style
had still exhibited a certain stuffiness (Nugent 1999:297).
In the end this may have affected voters' choice only marginally. One significant
aspect about the 2000 élections is the inability of parties other than the NPP and
NDC to make much headway. While this bipolarity is in line with the genera!
picture of Ghanaian politics since independence, the Nkrumahist parties have
been divided ever since Rawlings managed to co-opt their political tradition into
the (P)NDC fold. In the run-up to the second round, the NPP managed to get the
Nkrumahist parties to rally behind Kufuor, although in view of the NDC's past
and social background, Atta Mills could have laid a better claim to their support.
Nevertheless, the CPP — Nkrumah's vehicle to power in the 1950s — managed
to gain re-entry into parliament, albeit by only one seat representing the Ellem-
belle constituency in Western Region.34
The National Reform Party mentioned earlier clearly disappointed everyone. It
failed to win a single seat even though it had been tipped as a contender with a
promising political future. It had been argued that it enjoyed some roots in the
electorate and also had a présence in the rural areas, as opposed to the other small
parties. Many thought that its ideas on local-level decision-making and individual
economie empowerment made it an interesting political alternative.35 It may be
that its poor showing was the result of insufficient time to organise itself and that
it might yet gain greater political relevance in the future. However, while it had
been expected to eut especially into NDC territory, the fact that it sprang from the
ruling party may have made people sceptical.36
More generally, the fact that Ghanaians outside Volta and the northern régions
voted massively for Kufuor and the NPP may be interpreted as a clear sign of the
désire for change. On a national level, only eight out of a total of 200 parliamentary
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where the dearth of resources has constricted local empowerment and reinforced
dependence on financial patronage by thé central authorities (Nugent 200l).39
Nevertheless, Ghanaian politics still constitutes a System of political patronage
only in part. lts electorale does not simply assume a passive rôle — far from it.
There may indeed be an érosion process going on as far as authoritarian features
are concerned. In the debacle over the imposition of NDC parliamentary candi-
dates, the party leadership sometimes had to go on its knees to persuade local
constituencies to accept central government favourites (Africa Research Bulletin,
2000:14213). Some Ghanaian politicians were seen crossing party Unes. While
such behaviour is typical of patrimonial politics, it also enhances thé freedom of
choice of local communities and, with rival politicians vying for the favour of the
same électoral district, increases their potential influence. This is reinforced by
thé résurgence, after thé reintroduction of multipartyism, of thé middle-class-
based libéral tradition in Ghanaian politics, with its emphasis on civil and politi-
cal liberties (Konings undated). Ghana's libéral media climate is, indeed,
remarkable for sub-Saharan Africa.
By and large, voting patterns in 2000 followed régional unes, although in a way
différent from 1996. In thé previous élections, regional cleavages still matenal-
ised more or less along thé unes of a centre-periphery divide, with the NPP
winning mainly in thé Ghanaian heartland of pré-colonial Asante, leaving outly-
ing areas that had traditionally suffered from Ashanti domination to thé NDC.40
Now, however, thé NPP also gained many of thèse peripheral régions, or at least
some of their constituencies. In Brong-Ahafo, Kufuor won 15 of the 21 constitu-
encies in thé first round. This outcome could, however, be interpreted in différent
ways. Firstly one could argue that in thé 2000 vote thé old historical fault-line of
greater Asante — which marked off Ashantis from orner Akan and non-Akan
people and divided its core from outlying areas — was to some extent overcome,
with thé NDC only really managing to hold on to thé northern régions and Volta.
However, an alternative interprétation would be that in thé 2000 vote thé NPP
recaptured areas which had eluded it in thé 1992 and 1996 élections but which in
thé 1960s and 1970s had been strongholds of its predecessor parties (PP and
PFP). Brong-Ahafo and Eastern Région are clear examples. In that sensé, thé
2000 vote partially returned to thé électoral patterns of the pre-Rawlings era. In
any case, thé NPP's successes were still mainly in Akan areas, which makes it
questionable to what extent the party had now actually overcome the historie
limitations of the Danquah-Busia tradition (Nugent 2001:423).
Notably in the Volta région, the poor home région of President Rawlings, ethnic-
ity continued to play a distinct rôle in influencing the voters' line-up. Relations
between Akan and non-Akan have traditionally been marked by distrust, more
especially between Ashantis and Ewes. According to some observers, the NDC
waged a very negative anti-Ashanti campaign. Some politicians tried to exploit
distrust of Ashantis in the Volta Region, even going so far as to threaten that
Ewes might be evicted from Ghana and sent to Togo if the NPP came to power.
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Consequently, in Volta, people responded emotionally to any suggestion that they
might vote for the NPP, arguing that they would sooner vote for a goat than an
Ashanti.41 In the parliamentary polls the NDC therefore managed to take 17 of the
19 Volta constituencies while the NNP gained none. Even if Mills had to concède
6 per cent of the votes in the presidential run-off compared to Rawlings' record in
the 1996 élections, he still roundly defeated Kufuor (88 to 11 per cent) in Volta —
the only région where the NDC candidate managed to do so. Rather than voting
for the Ashanti Kufuor, the Volta electorale preferred the Fanti politician Atta
Mills.
However, the turn-out in both presidential rounds was significantly down on the
figures of 1996. In the previous presidential élection Volta could justifiably lay
claim to the epithet of Rawlings' 'World Bank', with 81 per cent of its eligible
voters making their way to the polling booth. Now, the turn-out dropped to a low
58 per cent in the first round (3 per cent less than the national average). In the
run-off it climbed back to 69 per cent — nine more than the national average
(www.ghanaelections.com; www.ifesorg.). Many Ghanaians explained this by
pointing to allégations aired during the élection campaign that the Volta région
had never really benefited from having one of its sons, Rawlings, occupying Osu
castle. Controversy erupted over the degree to which the Volta région had been
left behind in infrastructural Investment. It was said that Rawlings never wanted
to give preferential treatment to the Ewes for fear of being accused of favourit-
ism. Hence in a way the Ewe people had to pay a priée for having their son at the
helm of government. However, it should be pointed out that many Ewes have
traditionally migrated elsewhere in search of jobs and been well represented in
the country's civil service. 2 Moreover, if deprivation was such a dominant issue
in Volta politics, one would have expected that Rawlings and his party would be
repudiated at an earlier stage. By 2000, successful application of the 'big man-
small boy' dynamic43 was too late. Instead the NDC vote, and in the second round
the vote for Mills, held up steady. A better explanation of the low turn-out in the
first round would therefore be that the departure of Ghana's most charismatic
leader discouraged voters from showing up at the polling station.
Conclusions
Does the relatively smooth handover of power to the NPP signify a graduai
internalisation of the rules of the democratie game? Perhaps. If one looks at the
history of démocratisation elsewhere in the world, one is forced to realise that it
involves a very long-term historical process with twists and turns and, especially,
structural changes in économies and the patterns of social stratification. Ghana
may now have enjoyed the longest period of formal democratie politics since
independence, but any définitive conclusions about the chances of democratie
consolidation depend on far more extensive temporal parameters. As mentioned
above, political culture in Ghana is still marked by considérable intolérance. The
economie downturn could aggravate tensions among members of the political
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class and in social relations generally and hence put respect for the rules of the
game in jeopardy. While people in Ghana may hâve begun to realise thé signifi-
cance of their voting power,44 this cannot in thé end compensate for a lack of
significant socio-économie development that provides thé only solid basis to
genuine démocratisation, that is, thé growth in political equality between thé
social strata. While one should not argue that Africa has to follow thé political
trajectories pursued in other parts of the world, the history of démocratisation
shows that to a considérable extent thé franchise follows, rather than substitutes
for, an increase in social and political power. Nevertheless, thé smooth relinquish-
ment of power by the power clique that held Ghana in its grip for a décade shows
that there is no reason to be dismissive about the relevance of multiparty poli-
tics.45 In the medium term, the raies of the democratie game may at least help in
shifting the balance of power between sections of the political class itself, if not
between the social strata they purport to represent.
In the short term, it will be interesting to see whether the NPP will repeat the
mistakes of its predecessor parties: can it f ail to escape from the socio-cultural
entrapment of the Danquah-Busia tradition by concentrating its énergies on pro-
viding for the urban middle classes and the Ashanti, or Akan, sections of the
électorale generally? lts promised anti-corruption drive should prove pertinent
here, as one may reasonably expect that many Ghanaians who were excluded
from the NDC's patronage might now be tempted to take their turn and try to cash
in on the NPP's control of the state. Judging from Kufuor's cabinet appointments,
which included some (former) représentatives of rival parties and opposition
régions (Africa Confidential, January 26, 2001), thé président could be credited
with a cautious beginning.
This need not corne as much of a surprise, as thé NPP's élection campaign more
or less followed thé ideological electicism that formed the backbone of the
NDC's hegemony in the past. By castigating the government's économie record
and its involvement in corruption, thé NPP rallied to thé defence of Ghanaian
commoners and thé young — in a way copying NDC ideology. Yet it also paid
lip-service to thé basic neo-liberal parameters of the NDC's economie policies,
something that came very naturally to the NPP with its urban middle-class örigins
and the benefits that had accrued to Ghana's middle-classes from the structural
adjustment programmes implemented by the Rawlings administration. Only by
discarding a more narrow, urban middle-class bias, in favour of a more encom-
passing political programme in ostensible defence of all Ghanaians — including
especially the young, the poor and the rural folk — could the NPP defeat the
incumbent government. Rawlings had already shown them the way by combining
a neo-liberal economie agenda with a programme that catered especially for rural
interest groups, thus breaking the dichotomy in Ghanaian politics between the
liberalism of urban middle-class interests and the more populist policies pursued
by the Nkrumahist tradition. With a correct interprétation of these historical
changes wrought by the departing president, the NPP, rather than faced with a
The Ghanaian Elections of December 2000 199
shrinking of its political base as predicted by Nugent after the 1996 élections
(1999:313), managed to broaden its électoral support.
By inducing the opposition to follow in his footsteps, Rawlings can be credited
with having permanently transformed Ghana's political landscape. However, it
remains to be seen whether the NPP will be able to break out of the old Danquah-
Busia tradition or whether the outcome of the 2000 élections will appear to be as
much of an aberration from électoral trends as the victory obtained by the NPP's
predecessor, the Progressive Party, in 1969 (Nugent 1999:316). At present it
would appear that parliamentary arithmetic forces Kufuor to adopt a constructive
attitude towards other parties including the NDC, and the électoral strata they
claim to represent. With 100 out of 200 seats the NPP did not gain a majority in
the législature, forcing it to co-operate with other political forces. With 92 parlia-
mentary seats, thé NDC is still the second dominant political force in the country,
something the NPP must take into account when charting government policy.
Assuming that thé former ruling party can recover from its crushing defeat, both
parties could develop into permanent political alternatives for thé Ghanaian elec-
torate. With thé charismatic Rawlings as thé NDC's chairman-for-life, the party
may continue to exert considérable influence. Such a development could contrib-
ute to thé consolidation of multiparty politics even though the ideological distinc-
tions between thé two parties seem at present relatively muted, in line with the
prevailing international dominance of neo-liberal dogmas.
Notes
1. Results have been rounded to the percentage point. I would like to express my gratitude to Piet
Konings, Roger Southall and two anonymous référées for their comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
2. The results of thé parliamentary and presidential élections hâve also been published in the
Ghana Gazette.
3. If one included thé years of thé Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government
preceding NDC rule, one could even argue that it had been in power for 20 years. However, the
NDC's policies differed from that of the PNDC, while its administration included many new
faces apart from old PNDC stalwarts (Nugent 1995:273).
4. Sources for this article are data from interviews with scholars, journalists and other observers
of Ghanaian politics in December 2000 as well as various documentary material.
5. The register numbers 10,7 million (The Ghanaian Times, December 12, 2000). Some Ghana-
ians of thé opposition even said it should in reality number no more than 7 million (Africa
Confidential, November 24, 2000). In 1992, the register stood at 8,3 million and in 1996 at
9,27 million (Nugent 1999:305).
6. Foreign Minister Victor Gbeho won as an independent candidate. However, he did not leave
thé NDC.
7. Interview with Kwesi Aning and Leslie Boafo, Institute of Economie Affairs, Accra, Decem-
ber 4, 2000.
8. For a discussion of the bandwagon effect in African élections see Bratton and Van de Walle
1997:209 ff.
9. In 1996, Yendi and Gukpegu also voted for Kufuor, something that was related to violent
conflicts with the Konkomba, which had fuelled hostility among Dagomba and Nanumba
towards the Rawlings government (see Nugent 1999:308-9).
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10. In five Volta constituencies Kufuor got 20 to 25 per cent of the votes: Buem, Biakoye, Akan,
Krachi and Nkwanta. All figures from www.ghanaelections.com.
11. Interview with Edward Briku Boafu, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, December 8, 2000.
12. Interview with Edward Ameyibor, Ghana News Agency, Accra, December 8, 2000 and West
Africa, December 18, 2000 - January 14, 2001. This also played a rôle in thé Senegalese
élections earlier in thé year.
13. Interview with Kwesi Aning and Leslie Boafo, Institute of Economie Affairs, Accra, Decem-
ber 4, 2000 and news broadcasts Ghana Télévision, December 3-4, 2000.
14. For Florida coverage, see Daily Graphie, December l and 5, 2000; Public Agenda, December
4-10, 2000; and The Statesman, December 5-10, 2000 (all from Accra).
15. Interview with Kwesi Anings and Leslie Boafo, Institute of Economie Affairs, Accra, Decem-
ber 4, 2000 and The Guide (Accra), December 6-12, 2000.
16. Interview with Edward Ameyibor, Ghana News Agency, Accra, December 8, 2000. Whether
or not he was misquoted over some of these issues, in the past Rawlings has been cited as
arguing that the NPP would die in opposition (Africa Confidential, November 24, 2000).
17. The most serious incident before the élections took place on November 12 in a suburb of
Accra, where eight people were seriously wounded (Africa Confidential, November 24, 2000,
West Africa, November 27 to December 3, 2000).
18. Figures varied: seven people, according to the Africa Research Bulletin, 2000:14212; and 10
according to the Ghanaian Times and Daily Graphie (Accra), both December 11, 2000.
19. Interview with Edward Briku Boafu, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, December 8, 2000.
20. Interview with E. Gyimah-Boadi, Centre for Democracy and Development, Accra, December
4, 2000.
21. Mills was seen by many as a puppet of Rawlings. Interview with Edward Briku Boafu,
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, December 8, 2000 and with K. Kumado, Centre of Interna-
tional Affairs, University of Ghana, Legon, December 11, 2000.
22. Extensive analysis of the 1996 polls can be found in Ayee 1998.
23. Moreover, regional figures themselves represent totals compiled from individual constituency
results — which in turn may have been affected by very spécifie, such as local, factors.
24. Thus, the différence in Central Region's parliamentary seats between NDC and NPP was very
small (nine to eight), which would indicate that the party did not depend wholly on thé
charisma of Rawlings and/or the relevance of other factors in determining thé votes in thé
parliamentary élections.
25. Interview with Kwesi Aning and Leslie Boafo, Institute of Economie Affairs, Accra, Decem-
ber 4, 2000.
26. Generally on this issue in Africa, see Tangri 1999.
27. Interview with Stevens Ahiawordor, Political Science Department, University of Ghana, Le-
gon, December 11, 2000.
28. Interview with Edward Briku Boafu, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, December 8, 2000.
Also The Weekend Statesman (Accra), December 8-14, 2000.
29. The Electoral Commission did not act on this. Interview with K. Kumado, Centre of Interna-
tional Affairs, University of Ghana, Legon, 11 December 2000. Also Kumado 1996b:8-23.
30. This was reiteratedby Kufuor afterhis victory (West Africa, January 15-21, 2001).
31. Interviews held in Accra, December 2000.
32. Interview with K. Kumado, Centre of International Affairs, University of Ghana, Legon,
December 11, 2000. Technically this is not allowed under Ghana law (see Kumado 1996b:15).
33. Interview with Kwesi Aning and Leslie Boafo, Institute of Economie Affairs, Accra, Decem-
ber 4, 2000.
34. The winning candidate was Freddie Blay (The Evening News (Accra), December 12, 2000).
35. Interview with Edward Ameyibor, Ghana News Agency, Accra, December 8, 2000.
36. Interview with Edward Briku Boafu, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, December 8, 2000.
37. Interview with K. Kumado, Centre of International Affairs, University of Ghana, Legon,
December 11, 2000. In the 1992 and 1996 élections chiefs in Northern, Upper West and Upper
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East régions gave voting instructions to their people, providing thé NDC with overwhelming
majorities (Ayee 2000:155).
38. See Nugent 2001:407-10 for the spending of money in the hope of getting votes in the 2000
élections.
39. There is a parallel here with the situation in other African countries, such as Senegal (see Van
Walraven 2001).
40. For a discussion of geographical voting patterns in 1996, see Nugent 1999:305-6; Constituency
surveys in Ayee 1998:part III.
41. Interview with Kwasi Kpodo, Ghana News Agency, Accra, December 12, 2000. In northern
Ghana, a goat's head symbolised poverty and was used in the 1950s to underline distrust of
politicians in the southern, richer, parts of the country (see Lentz 1998:477).
42. Interview with Stevens Ahiawordor, Political Science Department, University of Ghana, Le-
gon, December 11, 2000 and The Ghanaian Voice, December 11-17, 2000.
43. On this dynamic in Africa generally, see Le Vine 1980:662, and for ils relevance for Ghana,
Price 1974.
44. Interview with K. Kumado, Centre of International Affairs, University of Ghana, Legon,
December 11, 2000.
45. The defeat, in February 2000, of the ruling Parti Socialiste in Senegal provides an interesting
parallel.
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